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# Historian of 'First CIA' Defends Present One

STATINTL

A historian whose chronicle of America's first intelligence organization has just been published thinks the Vietnam conflict has distorted the role of intelligence in the war and cast the Central Intelligence Agency in a false role.

The historian, R. Harris Smith, is on the faculty at UC Berkeley, and he worked for a time in the CIA during the Johnson administration. His book, "OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency," has just been released.

In an interview, Smith said the CIA has borne the brunt of the blame for the agony of American involvement in Indochina and has been cast as the bogeyman in the Vietnamese intrigue.

"I think there are surely things wrong with the CIA, but most of the blame for what's gone wrong in Vietnam falls to the White House," said Smith. The author also said that the CIA counseled against the Cambodian invasion ordered by President Nixon two years ago, and warned repeatedly that bombing North Vietnam would be largely ineffective.

The intelligence agency, said Smith, even informed the White House that no American prisoners were present in the camp at Son Tay, North Vietnam, before an abortive American raid on the camp resulted in the embarrassment of failing to free any U.S. captives despite serious risk to the raiding forces.

"I think that for the last three years we've seen a lot of CIA intelligence that has been disregarded by the White House," Smith charged. The 28-year-old author left the CIA "as did many people like me," because of disaffection with the early phases of the massive Johnson escalation of the Vietnam war.

"Seeing your advice disregarded is just one of the frustrations of intelligence work," Smith said.

In researching his tale of the organization of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II, Smith said he uncovered documents in the Stanford University library which still bore the "top secret" stamp. For that reason, the author said, his reservations about the federal government's classification system have been intensified.

"My feeling is that I wrote a book based on still-classified documents, even if they were 30 years old," Smith said. "The fact is that we have too much classification."

Smith said he has offered to testify for the defense in the espionage trial of Daniel Ellsberg, who supplied copies of the "Pentagon Papers" to the New York Times.

"I knew people at the CIA who thought he (Ellsberg) was a great defense analyst," said Smith.

"Leaking information is such a common practice," the author went on. "If you're high enough, you can do it with impunity. If you're low enough—like Ellsberg—you had better look out."

"There are things that should be kept secret. But from

what I've seen of the Pentagon papers, there's nothing in them to worry about."

Smith's book, which was turned down by four publishers before being accepted by the University of California Press, tells the story of the sometimes serious but often comical efforts of Gen. William "Wild Bill" Donovan to organize the OSS.

One anecdote in the work details the waste which occurred early in the OSS program because the agency was not required to account for much of its budget of several hundred million dollars.

One such incident, the book recalls, involved Donovan's efforts to place an agent on an isolated island to which there was no steamship or airplane service. In the end, a freighter was bought for "several million dollars," but Donovan's operatives subsequently realized that sending a whole ship to land one agent would seem, to say the least, conspicuous. The plan was scrapped, but the OSS lost track of the ship and no use was ever made of it.

--Allan Parachini

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# '69 Report to Nixon Was Split on War

## Tone Pessimistic

By Murrey Marder  
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon received "profoundly different" judgments from key government agencies at the start of his administration about the state of the war in Vietnam, the consequences of a Communist takeover, and the actions he was urged to take.

This is disclosed in the summary of a government survey ordered by the President on Jan. 21, 1969, the day after his inauguration. The study was National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, assembled by the National Security Council staff headed by presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger.

Many of the conclusions and recommendations in it have been altered or overtaken by events in the intervening three years of U.S. troop withdrawals from South Vietnam and international shifts of position by China and the Soviet Union in their relationships with the United States. But some of the findings shed light on new actions now unfolding, such as the current Communist offensive and the renewed U.S. bombing of North Vietnam's heartland.

One of the most striking disclosures in the study is the evidence it contains of great splits inside the federal bureaucracy between optimists and pessimists in assessing what had happened in Vietnam up to early 1969 when the survey was completed. While some of these differences have become public knowledge, especially with publication last year of the Pentagon Papers, which carried the war history up to 1968, this study reveals how these differing viewpoints were extended into the Nixon administration.

Two broad schools of assessment emerged among the policy planners. In the first group, more optimistic and "hawkish," were the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. military command in Vietnam, the Commander in Chief of Pacific forces, and the American Embassy in Vietnam headed by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. Often conflicting with the judgment of those advisers was a second grouping composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The first grouping, the summary of the study says, "expressed a pessimistic view of current and future prospects in Vietnam," with State, Defense and the

CIA "decidedly more skeptical about the present and pessimistic about the future."

These are some of the major disclosures in the summary:

- "Sound Analysis" of the effectiveness of American B-52 bomber strikes against enemy forces (B-52 strikes are currently being conducted for the first time against the North Vietnam heartland and on a different strategic rationale) was rated "impossible" to achieve. However, "the consensus is that some strikes are very effective, some clearly wasted, and a majority with indeterminate outcome."

- In early 1969, the optimists concluded that on the basis of programs then in existence, it would take "8.3 years" more "to pacify the remaining contested and Vietcong controlled population of South Vietnam. The pessimists estimated it would take "13.4 years" more to achieve that goal.

- In "sharp debate" over the validity of the "domino theory" consequences of a Communist takeover in Vietnam, military strategists generally accepted that rebounding principle, but most civilian experts concluded that while Cambodia and Laos could be endangered fairly quickly, the loss of Vietnam "would not necessarily unhinge the rest of Asia."

- On Soviet and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs and the U.S. military command in Saigon said that "if all imports by sea were denied and land routes through Laos and Cambodia attracted vigorously," North Vietnam "could not obtain enough war supplies to continue." But CIA and the Office of Defense, "in total disagreement," concluded that "overland routes from China alone" could supply North Vietnam with sustaining war material, "even with an unlimited bombing campaign."

President Nixon's subsequent actions in Vietnam have been more in accord with the pessimists' reached by the pessimists.

in this study, although his public explanations of his actions have reflected more of what the optimists were claiming in 1969.

In the process, the President cut U.S. forces in South Vietnam from over a half million at the time he took office to about 80,000 today.

While the NSC summary discloses sharp disagreements three years ago on the effectiveness of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, the current battlefield situation in Vietnam is much different from the situation in early 1969 and U.S. airpower is being applied in different ways.

In contrast to the guerrilla attacks or hit-and-run actions by larger units which have dominated the enemy's strategy until now, the current Communist offensive is much more like a conventional battle with tanks, artillery and massed troop concentrations standing and fighting.

Thus, it is reasoned officially, bombing now is more important and potentially more effective because big conventional battles need large quantities of fuel and ammunition to be sustained for more than a few weeks.

The NSC summary outlines sharp differences of opinion in early 1969 over the fighting capabilities of Saigon's forces, the importance of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville as a major entry point for enemy supplies, and the overall effectiveness of U.S. bombing.

To a surprising extent, the document portrays the Pentagon's civilian hierarchy within the Office of the Secretary of Defense as more cautious and skeptical in all of the major assessments affecting the future course of the fighting than the U.S. Military Command in Saigon or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The document also seems to make clear that it was

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continued

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**HENRY J. TAYLOR**

## Nixon's Peking Talks Jolted

STATINTL

The CIA has reported to President Nixon in Peking that, as we withdraw our troops, the Red forces are moving over Southeast Asia like termites on a log. The current alarm concerns Cambodia, Thailand and Burma, all three.

Cambodia is only the size of Oklahoma but it has 6.7 million people. The President's Vietnam pull-out was threatened by 30,000 North Vietnamese in Cambodia. Our incursion into Cambodia was a spoiling action covering our rear guard in Vietnam. But since then the keystone of the Nixon policy — Vietnamization — was tested by the Vietnamese Army's protectionary assault into Cambodia. And, as a demonstration to support the hope of Vietnamization, it was tragically unpromising.

The CIA advised the President that the disintegration heightens. The Cambodian Army has only 35,000 men. Phnom Penh, the capital is cut off, of course, except for a single uncertain road, but the Reds have now finished fortifying even fabulous Angkor Wat and completely control strategic Tonle Sap, the great lake of Cambodia. Premier Lon Nol is pressed toward a cease-fire.

**THAILAND BORDERS** on Cambodia; it stands between Cambodia, Laos and Burma.

The Siamese (34.7 million people) call their country Muang Thai, meaning Land of the Free People.

It has always been fiercely independent. In fact, Thailand is the only nation in the entire area that never has been ruled by a foreign power.

But the CIA has notified Mr. Nixon that Thai Army Commanding Gen. Prapas Charusathien reports that his units have intercepted Red Chinese and North Vietnamese soldiers crossing into Thailand's Sisaket and Surin provinces, 250 miles northeast of Bangkok. General Charusathien has only a 141,500-man force to meet this expansion.

**U. S. AMBASSADOR TO CAMBODIA** Emory C. Swank, in turn, apprised of this, is urging General Charusathien to add an army of ethnic Cambodians to meet Mao Tse-tung and Chou en-lai's expansion.

Burma, about the size of Texas, has a long common border with Thailand on Burma's

Shan states. But Burma (27 million people), fabled in Kipling's verses, is as different from Thailand as day and night. The home country of vacillating, mercurial former United Nations Secretary General U Thant, Burma is one of Southeast Asia's most inaccessible and mysterious countries.

Its actual name is the Pyee-Daung-Su Myanma Nainggan-Daw Union of Burma. The country is utterly provincial, totally fatalistic and unalterable Burmese. Neutralism, which likewise mesmerizes U Thant, is a fixation and isolationism a creed.

**BURMA CHIEF OF STATE** Gen. Ne Win, 60, his lidded eyes as rich as jade in a face as pale as bread and a man as wily and suspicious as U Thant himself, once told me in Mandalay, "Only Buddha can help anyone." And, not surprisingly, Burma's Marxist economy approaches absolute thrombosis.

Burma has a wild, mountainous 1,200-mile frontier — a third as long as our Canadian border — with Red China. Its armed forces total 137,500 men — 6,500 of them in a completely meaningless Air Force.

The CIA reported to President Nixon in Peking that 20,000 China-armed insurgents are now battling these forces. They are in a major engagement near Lashio, close to Red China's border. And, reported the CIA, 3,000 North Vietnamese are heading into Burma Shan state.

Ne Win incessantly travels abroad — always flamboyantly — plays golf and hobnobs with world dignitaries whenever possible and prefers the city of Mandalay where "the dawn comes up like thunder" to his capital of Rangoon. And until now Red China has adopted a restrained role toward Burma. The CIA opinion is that Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai felt that they can wait until Ne Win dies or is booted out, as he booted out predecessor U Nu, and then Red China will be sucked into Burma as in a vacuum.

The CIA message to the President changes this. Unrevealed, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma alike suddenly jolt Mr. Nixon's Peking talks and further complicate his success over there.

**The Washington Merry-Go-Round****U.S. Deception on Role in Cambodia****By Jack Anderson**

A secret exchange between Washington and Phnom Penh reveals that officials aren't telling the truth about the U.S. role in Cambodia.

Because of congressional hostility, the Nixon administration has pretended to take no active part in raising funds from other nations to support the tottering regime of Cambodian strongman Lon Nol.

The secret cables show, however, that the U.S. not only is bringing political pressure on other governments to contribute to Lon Nol but has actually prepared a solicitation letter for Lon Nol's signature.

Apparently, U.S. policymakers don't trust the Cambodian leader to write his own letters on such a delicate matter. The appeal was supposed to be addressed "on a personal basis" to other heads of state who might have a little cash to spare for Cambodian aid.

Congressmen have balked at financing Lon Nol because of the dismaying similarity between his regime and some of the corrupt, floundering South Vietnamese regimes that have cost the American taxpayers a fortune.

In an earlier column, we quoted from secret dispatches that described Lon Nol as "a sick man, both physically and mentally" and told of wide-

spread incompetence and corruption throughout his government.

**Compulsive Womanizer**

Even some of the able men under him were characterized respectively, as "an inveterate gambler," "a compulsive womanizer" and as a leader whose "personal authority is diluted by a tendency toward financial corruption."

American Ambassador Emory Swank, in one secret report, criticized "Lon Nol's haphazard, out-of-channel and ill-coordinated conduct of military operations." The result is that Communist hit-and-run harassing operations have developed—apparently much to the Viet Cong's surprise—into a serious military threat to the Cambodian capital.

Similar reports about some of South Vietnam's earlier political corruption and military bungling were kept secret from the American people. If the truth had been known in time, the U.S. might have been spared some of the lives and resources that have gone down the drain in Vietnam.

Because of the Vietnam experience, Congress is keeping a tight pursestring on Cambodian aid. The Nixon administration has gone behind congressional backs, however, to sneak military supplies into Cambodia through South Vietnam and Indonesia.

Now the administration has resorted to deception again to

raise exchange support funds for Cambodia.

Cambodia "has undertaken to do its own representations to elicit donors for the ESF," a State Department spokesman told us blandly.

**Secret Instructions**

But secret instructions were cabled to the American Embassy in Phnom Penh, declaring: "We believe political approach necessary lest finance ministries, who are generally opposed new aid programs, arrange for an evasive or negative reaction to (the Cambodian) appeal."

"Department believes high-level political appeal needed to improve chances for success. Letter from Lon Nol to heads of prospective donor governments could help nail down (contributions)."

The suggested letter begins: "Excellency: I am writing this note on a personal basis in order to bring to your Excellency's attention directly the economic problem that we are now confronted with in the Khmer Republic..."

It winds up: "I am asking that your government make a contribution of — to the fund for 1972 at a meeting to be held in Phnom Penh (on January 14)."

All Lon Nol had to do was fill in the blank space with the correct amount for each country. The sums that will be sought are: U.S., \$12.5 million; Japan, \$7.5 million; Australia,

\$3 million; Britain, \$500,000; New Zealand, \$300,000; Indonesia, \$250,000; Malaysia, \$250,000; Singapore, \$250,000; Thailand, \$250,000; and the Philippines, \$250,000.

Despite the State Department's public pretense that Lon Nol is running his own fund-raising drive, here's what the secret instructions add:

"Once letters sent, we prepared urge our embassies in key countries make high-level approaches in support of Lon Nol request. We understand that Japanese will then move out and actively lobby for participation in ESF. We can, on selective basis, do some lobbying here, especially with UK and Australia."

These secret instructions, like the India-Pakistan revelations, demonstrate, sadly, that the government of, by and for the people cannot always be trusted to tell the people the truth.



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## Better Deal for Service Spooks?

WHITE HOUSE SOURCES tell The JOURNAL that the intelligence reorganization announced last month by the President means a better deal, not less authority—as the country's press has been reporting—for members of the defense intelligence community.

Among the specifics cited:

- More "supergrades" (GS-16 to GS-18 civilian billets) for Defense Intelligence Agency.

- Assignment of top-caliber military personnel to DIA (which in past years has had trouble getting the most qualified military personnel assigned to it and proper recognition for their work in intelligence fields);

- Better promotion opportunities for intelligence analysts (who in the past have seldom been able to advance to top management levels without first breaking out into administrative posts that make little use of their analytical capabilities).

This last point stems from a major White House concern with the nation's intelligence product: "95% of the emphasis has been on collection, only 5% on analysis and production," as one White House staffer describes it. Yet good analysts, he points out, have faced major hurdles in getting recognition and advancement. Moreover, they have been "overwhelmed" by the amount of raw data collected by their counterparts in the more glamorous, more powerful, and better rewarded collection fields.

The supergrade problem has been of special concern to the White House. A high Administration official, who asked not to be named, told The JOURNAL that the "White House [has] pledged to get Civil Service Commission approval" for a GS-18 billet which had been urgently requested by DIA Director LGen Donald V. Bennett. Bennett, he said, first requested the billet more than a year ago. Even though DIA has not

had any authorization for a GS-18, it took almost 10 months for the papers needed to justify the single high-level slot to filter through lower echelon administrative channels in the Pentagon before they could be forwarded, with a "strong endorsement" from Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, to the Civil Service Commission.

Ironically, just one day after The JOURNAL was told of the White House's determination to help get the billet approved, it was learned that the Civil Service Commission had nevertheless *denied* the request. Instead, it offered DIA a choice of having an additional GS-17 slot or of having a Public Law 313 post (which would require that DIA first recruit an individual highly qualified enough to justify the appointment).

DIA's supergrade structure, nevertheless, is going to improve dramatically. For at least three years, the agency has been authorized only 15 supergrades, but will get 24 more under a plan just endorsed by Dr. Albert C. Hall, DoD's new Assistant Secretary for Intelligence. The posts are known to be endorsed strongly by both Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, and apparently enjoy strong backing from the White House as well.

By going from 15 to a total of 39 supergrade billets, DIA will be able not only to recruit higher caliber civilian personnel but to promote more of its own qualified analysts into these coveted, higher paying posts.

### Press Misses the Point

Press reports on the intelligence reorganization convey a much different picture than the above highlights and White House sources suggest. In a 22 November feature, *U.S. News & World Report* noted in a lead paragraph that "The Pentagon appears to be a loser in the latest reshuffle." Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard is probably the man most responsible for such interpretations. In a 4 November meeting with Pentagon reporters, just one day before the White House announced that CIA Director Richard Helms was being given new, community-wide responsibilities with authority over all intelligence budgets, Packard said: "There have been people thinking if we just had someone over in the White House to ride herd on this overall intelligence that things would be improved. I don't really support that view. . . . I think if anything we need a little less coordination from that point than more. . . ."

The White House's determination to make the defense intelligence field more attractive for military (as well as civilian) personnel was taken earlier this year by LGen John Norton, Commanding General of the Army's

## Our Outgunned Spies

A QUICK JOURNAL SURVEY of government-wide supergrade authorizations shows clearly that the Service side of the intelligence community, and DIA in particular, has been "low man on the supergrade totem pole" and makes clear why the White House Intelligence reorganization is aimed, in part at least, at giving Service "spooks" better recognition and more attractive career opportunities. Here are typical (in some cases, ludicrous) comparisons that can be drawn from Part II of the Appendix to the *Fiscal Year 1972 Budget of the United States*, a 1,112-page tome which gives, by federal agency, a detailed schedule of all permanent Civil Service positions:

- DIA has 3,088 Civil Service employees, but only 15 supergrades—roughly one for every 200 spooks.

- DoD's Office of Civil Defense has 721 Civil Service personnel, but 27 supergrades—one for every 27 employees, a ratio eight-to-one better than DIA's.

- The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, with only 776 civil servants, has 36 supergrades—one out of every 22, nine times better than DIA. The Peace Corps also outguns DIA nine to one, with 52 Foreign Service billets in the GS-16 to GS-18 salary brackets for only 1,188 permanent federal positions.

- The National Security Council staff has a 23-to-one advantage, 73 staffers and nine supergrade (or higher) billets. Even NSC's one-to-nine supergrade-to-staff ratio, however, pales by comparison with the President's Office of Science and Technology, which has 23 superposts but only 60 people!

Here's how the supergrade-to-people bean count for key federal agencies compares with DIA's (where authorized, executive level I through V posts are included in supergrade count):

Defense Intelligence Agency	1-206
Office, Secretary of Defense	1- 95
Library of Congress	1- 51
Office of Management & Budget	1- 78
Office of Economic Opportunity	1- 54
General Accounting Office	1- 68
Smithsonian Institution	1- 69
Civil Service Commission	1- 11
Federal Maritime Commission	1- 14

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And the article reports that the Defense Department is going ahead with plans to expand MEDT—the Military Equipment Delivery Team—forces to 500 by the end of next year.

According to Newsweek—

There are signs that the military men already in Cambodia are getting more directly involved in the fighting there. American helicopters have reportedly begun transporting Cambodian troops into battle areas and supplying them with ammunition. And at Pochentong Airport in Phnom Penh, U.S. forces recently opened a radio center (officially called a "navigation aid") to coordinate air support for Cambodian troops.

But planned escalation is not confined to personnel increases alone. Although this year's aid program for Cambodia calls for \$211 million in military aid, \$110 million in economic assistance and \$20 million in agricultural commodities for a total of \$341 million—a net increase of \$59 million over last year—the Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently want another \$52 million for military aid.

According to a story in the New York Times October 13, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have designed a costly program of "pacification" and other "unconventional warfare" for Cambodia, as well as ways to get more money to implement it than Congress is willing to authorize.

According to the Times, the Joint Chiefs have devised a battle plan to outflank the intent of Congress. According to this report the Chiefs offered four different ways of generating—on the sly—the additional \$52 million they want:

The first way would be simply to transfer \$52 million from the economic aid program to military spending, which can be done later in the fiscal year simply by the Administration's notifying Congress. The second way would be to use the economic aid fund for the purchase of all "common use" items such as trucks and jeeps, which have military as well as civilian value, thus freeing other military funds.

A third way would be to increase procurement for the United States Army by \$52 million and give the materiel to the Cambodians, for "repayment" later. The fourth way would be to make some exceptions in Defense Department supply regulations, declaring additional equipment to be "excess" and delivering it to the Cambodians.

Mr. President, if these reports are true, and past experience suggests that they probably are, it appears that the United States role in Cambodia is escalating significantly as more American dollars and more American personnel are becoming more involved in the war there.

The pattern is all too familiar to repeat: A tentative commitment becomes firm; a temporary presence becomes permanent; a limited role expands, and the executive branch of Government circumvents or ignores the advice and intent of Congress, if not the actual provision of laws.

And the unanticipated results, as we have found in Vietnam, can be disastrous.

Mr. President, the Senate will soon be making important decisions regarding the amount, scope, and type of aid to Cambodia when the Foreign Assistance Act comes to the floor.

The Foreign Relations Committee has taken an important step toward limiting

the scope of our growing involvement there by voting to impose a \$250 million ceiling on military and economic aid and to limit the number of U.S. civilian and military personnel to 200.

Since I came to the Senate in 1969, Congress has been attempting to restore the constitutional balance in the war-making power. Many Senators have recognized that executive branch ability to make war unilaterally is a very real danger to democracy. As Senator JOHN SRENNIS stated the other day before the Foreign Relations Committee while testifying on bills dealing with congressional war powers:

The President is faced with difficult day-to-day decisions in the Executive Branch in the field of foreign policy and the temptation is great to rely upon the threat of military force against a particularly troublesome or recalcitrant opponent.

But he went on to point out:

But the Constitution has placed the responsibility for deciding whether or not that force is to be used in the hands of the Legislative Branch. Thus it is not only our right but our Constitutional duty to insist that the President obtain the sanction of the Congress, the peoples' representatives, before he actually involves the nation in war.

Mr. President, it is clear that Executive decisions have shaped the course of the Indochina war and that an indifferent Congress provided little or no restraint on Executive actions. I recognize that some politicians will continue to prefer inaction or deference to the Executive in the exercise of a policy that could result in war, for scapegoats are often popular in politics and the assumption of responsibility often is not.

I feverently hope that such failure to accept responsibility is a thing of the past.

If the reports on Cambodia are true, as I believe they are, it should be clear that current and planned executive branch actions could take us into another ill-advised military adventure.

Congress has the ability to set wise limits on such dangerous Executive policy. The Foreign Relations Committee has given us a vehicle, in the Symington-Case amendment, for setting a proper limit in Cambodia.

Mr. President, I am pleased at this time to yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE).

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized for 7 minutes.

#### THE NEED FOR ABSOLUTE CEILINGS ON U.S. SPENDING AND PERSONNEL IN CAMBODIA

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding to me. I commend him for the remarks he has made and for the activities he has engaged in on this matter on several occasions in the past. He has been most helpful to the Senate and to the Nation in regard to the problems we are facing here. I am happy that his remarks preceded mine on this subject. Mr. President, the time has come for the United States as a Nation to decide what to do about Cambodia.

Recent press reports indicate what the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel must be done if we are to bring about a military solution in Cambodia. The Joint Chiefs' plan calls for a doubling of military expenditures and almost a five fold increase in the size of the Cambodian army.

Those are very disturbing proposals. In no event, however, should the fundamental question of whether the United States becomes even more deeply involved in yet another Southeast Asian country be decided within the executive branch under a veil of secrecy.

I thought we had painfully learned this lesson from our Vietnam experience, but the reports on the Joint Chiefs of Staff plans for Cambodia would seem to indicate the strong possibility that we may be about to repeat past mistakes.

My own view is that the overwhelming majority of Congress and the American people do not wish to repeat the Vietnam example.

We on the Foreign Relations Committee have on several occasions asked the Secretary of Defense for the 5 year plans for military assistance programs. We have always been refused access to these documents.

It is indeed unfortunate that we have to rely on leaks of secret papers to receive the plans for Cambodia. But considering the vast scope of the Joint Chiefs' proposals for that country, I can understand why the Pentagon has been reluctant to expose its thinking. The aid levels and force levels described in the New York Times and the Washington Post are so large that it is difficult to believe they could stand up to either congressional or public scrutiny.

If the proposals of the Joint Chiefs were put into effect, Cambodia would be turned into an armed camp absolutely dependent on us for its existence. And this would not just be for a year or two; but for the indefinite future. The Joint Chiefs project an expansion of the current 170,000 man Cambodian armed forces, 863,000 by 1977. In a country of less than 7 million people, we would then be supporting a military establishment which would be the proportional equivalent of more than 25 million Americans under arms.

It is of course the right of the Cambodians to decide how large their army will be, but it becomes very much our concern when the American taxpayer is asked to pay the bill. And there is no question that the United States would be paying virtually all the costs. The war has left the Cambodians themselves nearly without resources. As long as the fighting continues, they will be deprived of their three principal sources of foreign exchange: rice, rubber, and tourism. Moreover, as we found out in Vietnam, our other allies will do little if anything to share the costs.

The Joint Chiefs further propose that we get involved at all levels of Cambodian society with pacification programs, psychological warfare programs, and even unconventional warfare programs directed by the CIA. Again, as we learned in Vietnam, these kinds of American supported programs all lead to deeper and deeper entanglement.

# Review Is Slated on Options For New Buildup in Cambodia

By Spencer Rich

Washington Post Staff Writer

A high-level Nixon administration meeting with grave consequences for the fate of Cambodia is expected to take place this week, according to congressional sources.

On Monday, a "senior review" group of persons at the level of CIA Director Richard Helms, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard and Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson is scheduled to consider "options" for U.S. policy in Cambodia.

One alternative expected to be considered is an Aug. 30 "five-year plan" by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on how to win in Cambodia — "winning" being defined as building up the strength of Cambodian forces to the point where they could drive all North Vietnamese troops out of the country.

The Pentagon has never acknowledged existence of the plan, nor plans for the meeting. A spokesman said yesterday, "We have nothing to add" to what Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird said last Wednesday. Laird, questioned about the alleged plan following press reports on it, had neither confirmed nor denied its existence.

Congressional sources insisted, however, that such a plan does exist, that it was drafted as a result of a June 11 request for "options" by Presidential Assistant Henry A. Kissinger, and that it calls for a buildup of Cambodia's regular and "paramilitary" forces, with U.S. supplies, to 863,000 men by 1977. A congressional staff member estimated that the cost to the U.S. could reach anywhere from \$500 million to \$1 billion a year by 1977. He said Laird has turned down several earlier versions of the plan as too expensive.

Emphasizing that neither Laird nor the State Department has yet "bought" the plan — and may even be

somewhat dubious about it so far — the staff member gave this description of the proposal:

• The plan would be a classic application of the Nixon doctrine, with the U.S. furnishing military supplies and economic aid to support military operations by indigenous Cambodian forces. It envisions a force structure with "sophisticated" American-supplied trucks, tanks, armored cars, an artillery brigade and coastal patrol boats.

• A key feature would be anti-guerilla warfare, with the establishment of a commando-type Green Beret force manned by specially trained Cambodians. The JCS document is said to state, "Cambodia represents perhaps the classic case for the employment of unconventional warfare by the allies," and, further, that there should be "the highest possible priorities given to neutralizing the Khmer (Cambodian) Communist infrastructure," that is—infiltrating and destroying the Communist Party inner structure.

• The plan calls for a massive escalation of U.S. aid to Cambodia over the next five years. At present, the U.S. aid level—already vastly increased from two years ago—is \$185 million for military equipment, \$70 million for supporting assistance (special aid to the economy to keep it going despite defense burdens) and \$9 million from sales under the overseas food program. This is a total of \$264 million. The plan is said to call for a boost to \$377 million in fiscal 1972 and \$390 million in fiscal 1973. Some \$52 million of the 1972 figure would not be derived from congressional appropriations but from transfers from other accounts or "excessing" of U.S. military supplies. (Military supplies which the Pentagon declares "excess" may be sold or given away to other nations

at well below actual cost.") No cost estimates for years beyond that are contained in the plan.

• The plan calls for increasing the Cambodian regular army from 170,000 in fiscal 1971 to 220,000 in 1972, 250,000 in 1973 and 306,000 in 1977. "Paramilitary" forces—local militia and special forces—which are now at an undetermined level—would rise to 143,000 in 1972, 197,000 in 1973 and 557,000 in 1977. Combined regular and paramilitary forces would thus total 863,000 in 1977.

• The number of U.S. personnel on military equipment delivery teams in Cambodia—now 23—would jump to 104 in fiscal 1972. The number of Americans in South Vietnam engaged in channeling supplies to Cambodia, now estimated at 60, would rise to 400. Some 96 nationals of other Southeast Asian nations would be brought into Cambodia at U.S. expense to help provide a "clerical infrastructure" for the supply and training operations. The village pacification program would have eight different aspects, including village development and primary education.



# Kissinger And The Spooks

By Andrew Tully

The McNaught Syndicate, Inc.

WASHINGTON—Shortly after he took over his post as President Nixon's top adviser on national security affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger complained wryly to an aide that "These spooks really tell me more than I want to know about the birth rate in Cambodia."

Kissinger's reference was to the Republic's vast espionage empire, with its nearly 263,000 employees, its "secret" \$5-billion annual budget, and its penchant for overwhelming the White House with every scrap of incidental intelligence it can gather.

The story is timely because at long last it appears that something will be done to reduce the size and cost of this empire. Sen. Allen Ellender, D-La., chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, wants to cut \$500-million from the total intelligence budget, thereby eliminating 50,000 jobs. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird already is engaged in a reorganization plan to whittle down the size of the enormous military spy shop.

Laird got moving shortly after President Nixon, early this year, ordered a study of all intelligence operations. The pres-

tigious Central Intelligence Agency, which employs a variety of experts ranging from beauticians to nuclear scientists, is also expected to bite the economy bullet, albeit with a certain amount of kicking and screaming.

But the Pentagon will suffer most from the axe, for the simple reason that its intelligence community is the biggest and costliest—and possibly the least efficient. Laird presides over an establishment which includes the Defense Intelligence Agency, intelligence divisions of the three services and the super hush-hush National Security Agency, the nation's code-making and code-breaking apparatus. It is an establishment that employs some 150,000 people and spends an estimated \$3-billion a year.

Laird's spies are in trouble with President Nixon. He has been telling the defense Secretary for months that the military spy factory is "too damn big," and that its bigness apparently breeds inefficiency.

Specifically, although he boasted of both operations in public, Nixon was unhappy with the intelligence planning for the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos and the abortive prisoner-of-

war raid at Sontay. More recently, he has been "unimpressed"—as he told Laird—with intelligence on Viet Cong hit-and-run attacks in South Vietnam. Both the Pentagon and the CIA got a scolding from the President when they failed to discover Soviet missile installations near the Suez Canal during the summer of 1970.

Nixon also reportedly has cracked down on so-called "politico-sociological" studies conducted within friendly foreign countries by Army Intelligence, or G-2. After complaints from Secretary of State William Rogers, Nixon in July ordered the Pentagon to recall a research group dispatched to Czechoslovakia to prepare an estimate of the chances of a people's revolt.

Rogers is said to have described the project as representing a "dangerous gamble" that could get the U.S. in serious trouble. He compared it with the notorious 1955 "Camelot" project set up to determine the factors involved in promoting and inhibiting revolution in Chile. That operation was cancelled after a strong protest by the Chilean government, but by then it already had cost the taxpayers \$1-million.

Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that any administration by itself can reform our swollen intelligence community. Like all bureaucratic baronies, it is a powerful lobby within the administration. No President wants to be accused of restraining, for budgetary reasons, a spy who might discover tomorrow that Red China has invented a new bomb. Eventually, if any real reorganization is to be realized, Congress will have to step in with its power of the purse strings.

But the Nixon administration is indeed making the first meaningful progress in intelligence reform since Harry Truman established the CIA. Even if Congress again shirks its responsibilities, the cost of spying almost surely will be reduced in the next year or two. Richard Nixon has a record for frugality.

STATINTL



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CONFIDENTIAL

## THE ASIA LETTER

Number 372

AN AUTHORITATIVE ANALYSIS OF ASIAN AFFAIRS

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STATINTL

10 August 1971

Dear Sir:

THE C.I.A. IN ASIA (III): MODUS OPERANDI (Part 1). Every Friday, at precisely 8:30 A.M., a clean-cut young American assigned to the Combined Studies Group in Saigon leaves the American Embassy and drives to a rendezvous house on Saigon's Tran Hung Dao Street.

There, he picks up a briefcase and a Vietnamese accomplice and begins a drive to Tay Ninh, located northwest of Saigon near the Cambodian border.

Inside the briefcase are bundles of Vietnamese piasters, U.S. dollars and Cambodian riels.

The man carrying the briefcase is a C.I.A. "bag man". The money is the payoff for local agents and tipsters who keep tabs on Communist activities and movements in the important area of eastern Cambodia, southern Laos and the western border of Vietnam.

He is one of a dozen or more C.I.A. "bag men" who make regular trips to various parts of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to pay for the services of agents and informants.

The "bag man" never sees what a businessman would call the "end user"---the men who get the money. He merely turns it over to the C.I.A.'s "control man" in the area. Sometimes he picks up data to take back to the higher-up agents where he works. But more often than not he returns empty-handed.

The "bag man" duty usually goes to junior C.I.A. men in the Indo-China area. It is a colorless, unstimulating assignment that usually leads to frustration and sometimes to resignations.

One day last February, a Chinese cargo junk from Canton sailed down the Pearl River, through the river estuary and tied up alongside Hong Kong's Western waterfront.

It was one of many that made the same trip the same day to the western waterfront of Hong Kong Island and to the waterfront along Macao's ancient Rua das Lorches.

The river junks, which ply between Hong Kong, Macao and Canton daily, carry very ordinary cargo ranging from vegetables to joss sticks.

But the cargo of cabbages carried by that junk last February was no ordinary cargo. Stuffed inside one of the innocent-looking Chinese cabbages was a report giving up-to-date information on China's missile program.

It came from a C.I.A. informant inside China and went through a half dozen intermediaries in Hong Kong before it ended up in the hands of a high-ranking agent, who forwarded it on to Langley, Virginia, for study and analysis.

The C.I.A. frequently receives reports and messages from its agents and informants in China by this method. And it often sends in messages or instructions through the same channels.

The best example of just how effective these channels are came during China's Cultural Revolution (1966-69), which threw the country into turmoil. In addition to a flood of Red Guard documents giving a very accurate picture of the turmoil, the C.I.A. also received hundreds---perhaps thousands---of very valuable documents pilfered during some of the Red Guard rampages against government and foreign interests.

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continued

The Volume of information coming out of China is down from the peak of the Cultural Revolution days. But the agency still gets enough to enable it to come up with some amazingly accurate analyses and predictions about China's capabilities and intentions when used in conjunction with the millions of photographs taken by U.S. spy-in-the-sky satellites and data fed in through a myriad of other channels ranging from radio monitors to East European diplomats in Peking who are on the C.I.A. payroll.

NEXT: THE C.I.A. IN ASIA (III): MODUS OPERANDI (Part 2)

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DODGE CLOTH

STATINTL

# CIA seem poor choice for Viet scapegoat

By Crocker Snow Jr.  
Globe Staff

The Pentagon Papers (which now warrant the prefix 'public more than secret') suggest that the last few American Presidents should have listened more to the analysis from the Central Intelligence Agency about Vietnam than to their advisers in the State Department, Pentagon and National Security Council.

Starting from the earliest parts of the study of US involvement in Vietnam, the national intelligence estimates of the situation look reasonably sound — especially in the revealing glare of hindsight.

The partial documentation of the study suggests that the intelligence community weighed in quite negatively about President Ngo Dinh Diem and his effect on South Vietnam; downplayed the domino theory; was scornful of the value of committing US ground units to a combat role with only a limited bombing campaign underway; and ultimately helped persuade Defense Secretary Robert McNamara of the futility of Rolling Thunder, the bombing war on North Vietnam.

The 7000-page report on these events was compiled by the Defense Department and thus is more representative of Pentagon thinking on the war than of any other Washington agency.

Yet scattered references and direct quotations from CIA estimates can be found throughout. The foresight and overall accuracy of these estimates is one of the most dramatic impressions to come from a reading of these papers. The full report which have become available.

Some of the most important intelligence judgments which are at least partially documented in the report are listed here.

o In August 1954, when President Eisenhower was first being urged to prop up the South Vietnamese several months after the French defeat by Vietnamese communists at Dien-bienphu, a quoted national intelligence estimate read:

"Although it is possible that the French and Vietnamese, even with firm support from the US and other powers, may be able to establish a strong regime in South Vietnam, we believe that the chances for this development are poor and, moreover, that the situation is more likely to continue to deteriorate progressively over the next year."

o With Ngo Dinh Diem consolidating his regime in the South during the mid-fifties, the Pentagon writers describe American officials in the embassy, the military and the CIA as regularly reporting on him as "authoritarian, inflexible and remote." By 1960, when the United States, for better or worse, was supporting the then President Diem as a strongman, the CIA minced no words. One intelligence report which the Pentagon analysts characterize as "remarkably sound" in August of 1960 read in part:

"In the absence of more effective Government measures to protect the peasants and to win their positive cooperation, the prospect is for expansion of the areas of Viet Cong control in the countryside, particularly in the south. Dissatisfaction and discontent with the government will

probably continue to rise. These adverse trends are not irreversible, but if they remain unchecked, they will almost certainly in time cause the collapse of the Diem regime."

Four years later, with the United States beginning to get involved in a big way, the CIA is shown as one agency willing to debunk the then conventional wisdom of the domino theory, which held that if South Vietnam fell to the Communists all the rest of

East Asia would inevitably too. On June 9, 1964, several months before the Tonkin Gulf incidents, the report quotes President Johnson at a general meeting about the situation asking: "Would the rest of Southeast Asia necessarily fall if Laos and South Vietnam came under North Vietnamese control?"

The CIA, according to the Pentagon study, answered that Cambodia "might," but no other nation "would quickly succumb."

The agency acknowledged that such a development "would be profoundly damaging to the US position in the Far East" and suggested that it would hurt American prestige and credibility in containing the spread of communism in the area. But the CIA said that even a clear-cut Communist victory in the South would not affect the wider American interest of containing overt attacks "as long as the United States can effectively operate from (its island) bases" in the Far East.

In October 1964, following Tonkin Gulf, at the high point of President Johnson's election campaign vs. Barry Goldwater with a continuing political

crisis in Saigon a year after Diem's assassination, while the defense establishment was actively considering a number of contingency plans for widening the war, the CIA was far from sanguine about the prospects: "We believe that the conditions favor a further decay of GVN (Government of South Vietnam) will and effectiveness. The likely pattern of this decay will be increasing defeatism, paralysis of leadership, friction with Americans, exploration of possible lines of political accommodations with the other side, and a general petering-out of the war effort."

o The following spring with the Rolling Thunder bombing of North Vietnam underway, President Johnson prepared to send two Marine battalions into the war as the Joint Chiefs

asked Secretary McNamara to clear away "all administrative impediments that hamper us in the prosecution of this war."

Just at this time, on April 2, 1965, according to one of the chronologies contained in the Pentagon report, CIA director McCone circulated a memo "dissenting from the presidential decision to have US troops take active part in active combat."

"He feels that such action is not justified and wise unless the air attacks on the North are increased sufficiently to really be physically damaging to the DRV (Democratic Republic of North Vietnam), and to put real pressure on her." The CIA director predicted, said the report, that the United States "was getting mired down in a war it could not win."

STATINTL

continued

# Pentagon Papers: The Secret War

*To see the conflict and our part in it as a tragedy without villains, war crimes without criminals, lies without liars, espouses and promulgates a view of process, roles and motives that is not only grossly mistaken but which underwrites deceptions that have served a succession of Presidents.*

—Daniel Ellsberg

THE issues were momentous, the situation unprecedented. The most massive leak of secret documents in U.S. history had suddenly exposed the sensitive inner processes whereby the Johnson Administration had abruptly escalated the nation's most unpopular—and unsuccessful—war. The Nixon Government, battling stubbornly to withdraw from that war at its own deliberate pace, took the historic step of seeking to suppress articles before publication, and threatened criminal action against

that the Government was fighting so fiercely to protect. Those records afforded a rare insight into how high officials make decisions affecting the lives of millions as well as the fate of nations. The view, however constricted or incomplete, was deeply disconcerting. The records revealed a dismaying degree of miscalculation, bureaucratic arrogance and deception. The revelations severely damaged the reputations of some officials, enhanced those of a few, and so angered Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield—a long-patient Democrat whose own party was hurt most—that he promised to conduct a Senate investigation of Government decision making.

The sensational affair began quietly with the dull thud of the 486-page Sunday New York Times arriving on doorsteps and in newsrooms. A dry Page One headline—VIETNAM ARCHIVE: PEN-


John Mitchell charged that the Times's disclosures would cause "irreparable injury to the defense of the United States" and obtained a temporary restraining order to stop the series after three installments, worldwide attention was inevitably assured.

## A Study Ignored

The Times had obviously turned up a big story (see PRESS). Daniel Ellsberg, a former Pentagon analyst and superhawk-turned-superdove, apparently had felt so concerned about his involvement in the Viet Nam tragedy that he had somehow conveyed about 40 volumes of an extraordinary Pentagon history of the war to the newspaper. Included were 4,000 pages of documents, 3,000 pages of analysis and 2.5 million words—all classified as secret, top secret or top secret-sensitive.

The study was begun in 1967 by Sec-

STATINTL



JULY 1965: JOHNSON DISCUSSING VIET NAM POLICY BEFORE TELEVISION SPEECH

*Always the secret option, another notch, but never victory.*

the nation's most eminent newspaper.

The dramatic collision between the Nixon Administration and first the New York Times, then the Washington Post, raised in a new and spectacular form the unresolved constitutional questions about the Government's right to keep its planning papers secret and the conflicting right of a free press to inform the public.

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tioned (see story page 17). Yet, even more fundamental, the legal battle focused national attention on the records

TAGON STUDY TRACES 3 DECADES OF GROWING U.S. INVOLVEMENT—was followed by six pages of deliberately low-key prose and column after gray column of official cables, memorandums and position papers. The mass of material seemed to repel readers and even other newsmen. Nearly a day went by before the networks and wire services action was to refrain from comment so as not to give the series any greater "exposure." But when Attorney General

retary of Defense Robert McNamara, who had become disillusioned by the futility of the war and wanted future historians to be able to determine what had gone wrong. For more than a year, 35 researchers, including Ellsberg, Rand Corporation experts, civilians and uniformed Pentagon personnel, worked out of an office adjoining McNamara's. With his backing, they were able to obtain Pentagon documents dating back to arguments within the Truman Administration on whether the U.S. should help

# Tell CIA pullout advice to Nixon

By Morton Kondracke  
and Thomas B. Ross

Sun-Times Bureau

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WASHINGTON — The Nixon administration was advised by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1969 that it could immediately withdraw from Vietnam and "all of Southeast Asia would remain just as it is at least for another generation."

Government documents revealed Friday that the CIA offered the following prediction of what would happen if President Nixon, at the start of his administration, had pulled all U.S. troops out of Vietnam and opened the way to a possible Viet Cong take-over of the Saigon government:

"We would lose Laos immediately. Sihanouk would preserve Cambodia by a straddling effort. All of Southeast Asia would remain just as it is at least for another generation.

"Thailand, in particular, would continue to maintain close relations with the U.S. and would seek additional support. Simultaneously, Thailand would make overtures and move toward China and the Soviet Union. It would simply take aid from both sides to preserve its independence.

"North Vietnam would consume itself in Laos and South Vietnam. Only Laos would definitely follow into the Communist orbit."

In totally rejecting the so-called domino theory on which U.S. policy was based in the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the CIA took a position consistent with a long line of estimates dating back to the original U.S. involvement in 1954.

For example, the documents show that on May 25, 1964, the CIA declared in a National Intelligence Estimate that the United States would "retain considerable leverage in South-

Robert McNamara's doubts in 1966 on escalating the war revealed, Page 6.

east Asia even if Laos and South Vietnam came under North Vietnamese control."

The CIA produced the estimate as part of its pessimistic assessment of the value of launching a bombing campaign against North Vietnam. It argued that air attacks were unlikely to break Hanoi's will and carried the danger of escalating the war into a direct confrontation with Communist China and the Soviet Union.

"Retaliatory measures which the North might take in Laos and South Vietnam," the CIA declared, "might make it increasingly difficult for the U.S. to regard its objectives as attainable by limited means. Thus, difficulties of comprehension might increase on both sides as scale of action mounted."

Former President Lyndon B. Johnson rejected the CIA's advice and started sustained bombing in February, 1965.

Similarly, President Nixon disregarded the CIA estimate in 1969 and decided on a slow withdrawal, an expansion of the war into Cambodia and Laos and a partial revival of the bombing of North Vietnam.

On several occasions since coming to office, Mr. Nixon has referred to immediate, total U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia as "precipitate" and the equivalent of "our defeat and humiliation."

In various ways, he has signaled an intention to preserve non-Communist governments in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Instead of pulling out of Vietnam rapidly, Mr. Nixon has withdrawn gradually, to give the South Vietnamese a "reasonable chance" to maintain their present government.

U.S. troop levels were at 540,000 when Mr. Nixon took office. They are scheduled to be down to 184,000 by Dec. 1, close to the end of Mr. Nixon's third year in office. The President has not said when — if ever — U.S. forces will be completely gone from Vietnam.

Meanwhile, Mr. Nixon stoutly denied that the invasions of Cambodia in 1969 and Laos in 1970 constituted expansions of the war or were even related to political conditions in those countries.

In 1969, U.S. troops joined South Vietnamese forces in the invasion, while the Laos incursion was conducted by Vietnamese ground forces supported by U.S. planes and helicopters.

Mr. Nixon defended both actions as efforts to speed the "end of the war" in South Vietnam. Nevertheless, the administration has exhibited interest in preserving the non-Communist character of the governments of Laos and Cambodia.

There has been a massive infusion of military and economic aid to the anti-Communist regime of Lon Nol in Cambodia, and U.S. air power continues to support South Vietnamese and Cambodian army combat operations

heels of Lon Nol's overthrow of Sihanouk, the man the CIA predicted would retain power if the United States left Southeast Asia. The United States did not leave, and Sihanouk fell. In some quarters, his overthrow has been ascribed to the CIA.

In Laos, the United States has continued extensive bombing raids both along the Ho Chi Minh infiltration routes in the southern part of the country and in north Laos near the Plain of Jars.

The north Laos operations — bombing and aid to anti-Communist guerillas — are linked to retention of a neutralist government in Vientiane, the capital.

The government documents, disclosed to The Sun-Times by a number of reliable sources, show the CIA consistently reported that the bombing of North Vietnam was not effective, either in military or political terms.

The CIA's estimates, the documents also reveal, provided the basis for former Defense Sec. Clark Clifford's silent campaign to get the bombing stopped in 1968.

The CIA's Office of National Estimates advanced the case against the bombing in 1965 despite CIA Director John A. McCone's advice that U.S. planes "hit them harder, more frequently, and inflict greater damage."

In an April 2, 1965, memo to Sec. of State Dean Rusk, White House adviser McGeorge Bundy and Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor, McCone argued that Mr. Johnson's decision the previous day to commit U.S. troops to combat would: work only "if our air strikes against the north are sufficiently heavy and damaging really to hurt the North Vietnamese."

He warned that a slow escalation of the bombing would open the U.S. government to "increasing pressure" from the press and public opinion to stop the raids.

Then, McCone concluded: "We will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win, and from which we will have extreme difficulty in extracting ourselves."

At Honolulu parley

STATINTL

# CIA played down US domino theory

By Darius S. Jhabvala  
Globe Staff

A key Johnson Administration military adviser had proposed in 1964 that tactical nuclear weapons would have to be deployed if Communist Chinese forces entered the ground war in Vietnam. Admiral Harry D. Felt, then the commander in chief of the Pacific forces, emphatically demanded also that commanders be given the freedom to use such weapons "as had been assumed under various plans."

This question, among others, was discussed among his top advisers at the Honolulu conference, June 1-2, 1964.

Following the meeting, President Johnson asked his advisers the basic question: "Would the rest of Southeast Asia necessarily fall if Laos and South Vietnam came under North Vietnamese control?"

On June 9, the Board of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency, provided a response, stating:

"With the possible exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to Communism as a result of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a continuation of the spread of Communism in the area would not be inexorable and any spread which did occur would take time — time in which the total situation might change in any number of ways unfavorable to the Communist cause."

These and other details are part of the on Vietnam study that was made for Defense Department.

The State Department approached the Honolulu conference "with a basic assumption," namely "our point of departure is and must be that we cannot accept the overrunning of southeast Asia by Hanoi and Peking."

Beyond this, the discussions "were intended to help clarify issues with respect to exerting pressures against North Vietnam." The joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that "the US should seek through military actions to accomplish destruction of the North Vietnamese will and capabilities as necessary to compel the Democratic Government of Vietnam to cease providing support to the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos."

## LIMITED ACTION

However, the JCS went on to note that "some current thinking appears to dismiss the objective in favor of a lesser objective, one visualizing limited military action which, hopefully, would cause the North Vietnamese to decide to terminate their subversive support."

During discussions of the extent of new military action, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge "argued in favor of attacks on north." He is reported to have stated "his conviction that most support for the Viet Cong would fade as soon as some 'counter-terrorism measures' were begun against DRV."

Discussions then turned to the desirability of obtaining a congressional resolution prior to wider US action. Lodge felt that it would not be necessary, since the US response would be on a "tit-for-tat" basis. But Defense Secretary McNamara, Rusk and CIA Director John McCone all argued in favor of the resolution.

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, then raised "the final possibility" of Chinese involvement. Were that to occur, the allies would require "seven ground divisions."

"Secretary McNamara then went on to say that the possibility of major ground action also led to a serious question of having to use nuclear weapons at some point," the reports points out. "Admiral Felt responded emphatically that there was no possible way to hold off the Communists on the ground without the use of tactical nuclear weapons and that it was essential that the commanders be given freedom to use these as had been assumed under various plans," it added.

Gen. Taylor was "more doubtful as to the existence or at least to the degree of the nuclear weapon requirement."

"The point, the report concluded, 'was not really followed up.'"

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STATINTL

# U.S. uses Thai troops in Laos

By Richard E. Ward  
Second of two articles

A rare secret session of the Senate was held at the request of Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) June 7 to hear a report on U.S. clandestine activities in Laos. Following the session, Senators Symington and J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) openly charged that the use of Thai mercenaries, just admitted that same day by the State Department which calls them "volunteers," was violating congressional restrictions on U.S. operations in Laos.

Some details of the nearly 3½-hour closed door meeting were given in the June 8 Washington Post in an article by Spencer Rich who reported:

—Symington, who revealed that the administration wants \$374 million for military and economic programs in Laos for the 1972 fiscal year (a figure which does not include the \$2 billion estimated costs of bombing), said that he wanted the Senate to know the details of "the secret war" before appropriating funds for it.

—Of the request, \$120 million is said to be earmarked for funding CIA operations in Northern Laos, including the use of Mco mercenaries from Laos as well as at least 4800 Thai troops.

—A major issue in the secret debate centered upon whether the use of Thai forces was in contravention of the 1970 Fulbright amendment to the 1971 Defense Appropriations Act, signed into law by President Nixon Jan. 11 this year. The amendment barred use of Defense Department funds to support what the Pentagon calls "free world forces" in actions "designed to provide military support and assistance to the government of Cambodia or Laos."

—The massive bombing of Northern Laos, which has nothing to do with the movement of supplies from North Vietnam to the South or Cambodia, was questioned by several senators, including Fulbright and Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.).

## Nixon the lawbreaker

After the Senate meeting, Rich reported that Symington stated: "My personal opinion is...that the law has been contravened. The amendment said you couldn't spend money to train and put people of foreign governments into Laos or into Cambodia." That was also Fulbright's view. State Department sources later said, according to Rich, "that the Thais being used aren't recruited on a government-to-government basis, but were individuals recruited from the borderside Thai population."

The Post report obviously left out many details of the Senate discussion, assuming the legislative body got a full account of U.S. activities. Symington's disclosures were based on a report by two staff members of his subcommittee of the Foreign Relations committee, James Lowenstein and Richard Morse, who had recently made an inquiry into Laos.

Reportedly the Symington subcommittee now has a relatively accurate account of U.S. activities in Laos that is more complete than was provided by the administration at secret hearings in October 1969, released after "security" deletions by the administration in April 1970. What might be called the battle of Laos in Washington, concerns the attempt by antiwar senators to get U.S. activities in Laos itself into the public record. Initially and perhaps still, some senators have been reacting against the administration's deception of themselves along with the public. However, the issue of Laos is now being put forward to oppose administration policy in Indochina as a whole because it so clearly reveals the White House aim of maintaining—if not expanding—the war. This point remains clouded during discussions focusing on Vietnam because troop withdrawals are still used by the supporters of U.S. aggression to obscure the actual aims of U.S. policy.

As has been previously noted by the Symington subcommittee, the lid of U.S. official secrecy conceals little that is not known by informed journalists or "the other side." Certainly the Pathet Lao knows what is happening in Laos. They are obviously fully aware of the bombings by the Air Force as well as the array of CIA programs. Although no reliable figure had been released on U.S. spending on its Laotian programs, the Pathet Lao accurately estimated it last summer as greater than \$300 million (again apart from bombing).

## Number of Thai troops growing

Concerning the use of Thai troops, the Pathet Lao stated last year that they numbered about 1000 during the Johnson administration (a figure that has recently been corroborated in the press and by Sen. Fulbright) and that the increase in Thai forces was undertaken by Nixon. However, according to the Pathet Lao, the number of Thai troops now exceeds the 4800 figure used by Fulbright.

In April of this year, Prince Souphanouvong, head of the Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao), charged that the number of Thai troops was being augmented by the U.S. Shortly after this, George W. Ashworth reported in the April 17 Christian Science Monitor: "Nixon administration officials have hammered out an agreement with the government of Thailand for sharply increased use of Thai forces in Laos."

Thai troops were previously used in the ill-fated U.S.-backed attempt to hold the Plain of Jars, which ended in an important Pathet Lao victory in February 1970. Presumably the losses then were an element leading to the more formalized agreement for use of Thai troops. Bangkok may relinquish some of its sovereignty to Washington, but not without a price.

Thai "volunteer" troops used in South Vietnam were given a bonus by the U.S. considerably augmenting their regular pay while Bangkok received military hardware and other considerations from the Johnson administration to agree to use of Thais in Vietnam. There is no reason to assume that Bangkok's price has gone down, more likely it is up. Confirming this, a Senate source has noted that the cost of the mercenaries was high. Symington on June 7 referred to both regular and irregular Thai troops being used in Laos, so it is possible that part of the deal with Bangkok involves freedom for the CIA to recruit directly in Thailand. Taking all evidence into account, Thai troops in Laos may now number 10,000 or higher.

Senators Symington and Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) attacked administration activities in Laos in statements issued a day before the secret debate. Symington emphasized the administration furtiveness while Kennedy charged that U.S. military activities in Northern Laos lacked constitutional authority, which seemed to be implicitly saying that the U.S. was conducting a war against the Laotian people without a declaration of war or congressional authority.

## Wide destruction

Among the facts to emerge from the recent congressional debate is the acceleration of U.S. bombing in Laos, or rather, of the liberated zone since the autumn of last year, and the increased use of B-52s, a plane whose bombing reaches the peak of indiscriminate destructiveness. The step-up in B-52 activity in Laos has largely coincided with the accelerated "protective reaction strikes" being carried out against North Vietnam, and it is quite possible that one of the real purposes of these attacks is an effort to prevent the DRV from utilizing its potent aerial defenses to assist their Laotian neighbors.

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continued



# KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIETNAM

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering the opening of the sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam in the first half of 1965. Except where excerpting is indicated, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

## Letter From Rostow Favoring Commitment of Troops by U.S.

Personal letter from Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, to Secretary McNamara, Nov. 16, 1964, "Military Dispositions and Political Signals."

Following on our conversation of last night I am concerned that too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North, not enough thought to the signal we wish to send.

The signal consists of three parts:

a) damage to the North is now to be inflicted because they are violating the 1954 and 1962 accords;

b) we are ready and able to go much further than our initial act of damage;

c) we are ready and able to meet any level of escalation they might mount in response, if they are so minded.

Four points follow.

1. I am convinced that we should not go forward into the next stage without a US ground force commitment of some kind:

a. The withdrawal of those ground forces could be a critically important part of our diplomatic bargaining position. Ground forces can sit during a conference more easily than we can maintain a series of mounting air and naval pressures.

b. We must make clear that counter escalation by the Communists will run directly into US strength on the ground; and, therefore the possibility of radically extending their position on the ground at the cost of air and naval damage alone, is ruled out.

c. There is a marginal possibility that in attacking the airfield they were thinking two moves ahead; namely, they might be planning a pre-emptive ground force response to an expected US retaliatory force for the Bien Hoa attack.

2. The first critical military action against North Vietnam should be designed merely to install the principle that they will, from the present forward, be vulnerable to retaliatory attack in the north for continued violations of the 1954 and 1962 Accords. In other words, we would signal a shift from the principle involved in the Tonkin Gulf re-

sponse. This means that the initial use of force in the north should be as limited and as unsanguinary as possible. It is the installation of the principle that we are initially interested in, not tit for tat.

3. But our force dispositions to accompany an initial retaliatory move against the north should send three further signals lucidly:

a. that we are putting in place a capacity subsequently to step up direct and naval pressure on the north, if that should be required;

b. that we are prepared to face down any form of escalation North Vietnam might mount on the ground; and

c. that we are putting forces into place to exact retaliation directly against Communist China, if Peiping should join in an escalatory response from Hanoi. The latter could take the form of increased aircraft on Formosa plus, perhaps, a carrier force sitting off China distinguished from the force in the South China Sea.

4. The launching of this track, almost certainly, will require the President to explain to our own people and to the world our intentions and objectives. This will also be perhaps the most persuasive form of communication with Ho and Mao. In addition, I am inclined to think the most direct communication we can mount (perhaps via Vientiane and Warsaw) is desirable, as opposed to the use of cut-outs. They should feel they now confront an LBJ who has made up his mind. Contrary to an anxiety expressed at an earlier stage, I believe it quite possible to communicate the limits as well as the seriousness of our intentions without raising seriously the fear in Hanoi that we intend at our initiative to attack North Vietnam, or to seek in Delta, in China, or seek any other objective than the re-installation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords.

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appreciation of the view in Hanoi and Peiping of the Southeast Asia problem. I agree almost completely with SNIE 10-3-64 of October 9. Here are the critical passages:

"While they will seek to exploit and encourage the deteriorating situation in Saigon, they probably will avoid actions that would in their view unduly increase the chances of a major US response against North Vietnam (DRV) or Communist China. We are almost certain that both Hanoi and Peiping are anxious not to become involved in the kind of war in which the great weight of superior US weaponry could be brought against them. Even if Hanoi and Peiping estimated that the US would not use nuclear weapons against them, they could not be sure of this. . . .

"In the face of new US pressures against the DRV, further actions by Hanoi and Peiping would be based to a considerable extent on their estimate of US intentions, i.e., whether the US was actually determined to increase its pressures as necessary. Their estimates on this point are probably uncertain, but we believe that fear of provoking severe measures by the US would lead them to temper their responses with a good deal of caution. . . .

"If despite Communist efforts, the US attacks continued, Hanoi's leaders would have to ask themselves whether it was not better to suspend their support of Viet Cong military action rather than suffer the destruction of their major military facilities and the industrial sector of their economy. In the belief that their favor in South Vietnam, they might

# KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIETNAM

Following are texts of key documents from the Pentagon's history of the Vietnam war, covering events of August, 1964, to February, 1965, the period in which the bombing of North Vietnam was planned. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

## Rusk Cable to Embassy in Laos On Search and Rescue Flights

Cablegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the United States Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, Aug. 26, 1964. A copy of this message was sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific.

We agree with your assessment of importance SAR operations that Air America pilots can play critically important role, and SAR efforts should not discriminate between rescuing Americans, Thais and Lao. You are also hereby granted as requested discretionary authority to use AA pilots in T-28's for SAR operations when you consider this indispensable rpt indispensable to success of operation and with understanding that you will seek advance Washington authorization wherever situation permits.

At same time, we believe time has come to review scope and control arrangements for T-28 operations extending into future. Such a review is especially indicated view fact that these operations more or less automatically impose demands for use of US personnel in SAR operations. Moreover, increased AA capability clearly means possibilities of loss somewhat increased, and each loss with accompanying SAR operations involves chance of escalation from one action to another in ways that may not

be desirable in wider picture. On other side, we naturally recognize T-28 operations are vital both for their military and psychological effects in Laos and as negotiating card in support of Souvanna's position. Request your view whether balance of above factors would call for some reduction in scale of operations and-or dropping of some of better-defended targets. (Possible extension T-28 operations to Panhandle would be separate issue and will be covered by septel.)

On central problem our understanding is that Thai pilots fly missions strictly controlled by your Air Command Center with [word illegible] in effective control, but that this not true of Lao pilots. We have impression latter not really under any kind of firm control.

Request your evaluation and recommendations as to future scope T-28 operations and your comments as to whether our impressions present control structure correct and whether steps could be taken to tighten this.

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It might be used by Souvanna as bargaining counter in obtaining satisfaction on his other condition that he attend conference as head of Laotian Government. Remaining condition would be cease-fire. While under present conditions cease-fire might not be of net advantage

to Souvanna—we are thinking primarily of T-28 operations—Pathet Lao would no doubt insist on it. If so, Souvanna could press for effective ICC policing of cease-fire. Latter could be of importance in upcoming period.

3. Above is written with thought in mind that Polish proposals [one word illegible] effectively collapsed and that pressures continue for Geneva [word illegible] conference and will no doubt be intensified by current crisis brought on by DRV naval attacks. Conference on Laos might be useful safety valve for these generalized pressures while at same time providing some deterrent to escalation of hostilities on that part of the "front." We would insist that conference be limited to Laos and believe that it could in fact be so limited, if necessary by our withdrawing from the conference room if any other subject brought up, as we did in 1961-62. Side discussions on other topics could not be avoided but we see no great difficulty with this; venue for informal corridor discussion with PL, DRV, and Chicom could be valuable at this juncture.

4. In considering this course of action, key initial question is of course whether Souvanna himself is prepared to drop his withdrawal precondition and whether, if he did, he could maintain himself in power in Vientiane. We gather that answer to first question is probably yes but we are much more dubious about

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## Rusk Query to Vientiane Embassy On Desirability of Laos Cease-Fire

Cablegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the United States Embassy in Laos, Aug. 7, 1964. Copies were also sent, with a request for comment, to the American missions in London, Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delhi, Moscow, Phnompenh and Hong Kong, and to the Pacific command and the mission at the United Nations.

1. As pointed out in your 219, our objective in Laos is to stabilize the situation again, if possible within framework of the 1962 Geneva settlement. Essential to stabilization would be establishment of military equilibrium in the country. Moreover, we have some concern

that recent RLG successes and reported low PL morale may lead to some escalation from Communist side, which we do not now wish to have to deal with.

2. Until now, Souvanna's and our position has been that military equilibrium would require Pathet Lao withdrawal from areas seized in PDJ since May 15

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# KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIET STUDY

*Following are the texts of key documents from the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam situation from December, 1963, through the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964, and its aftermath. Except where indicated, the documents are printed verbatim; typographical errors corrected.*

## McNamara Report to Johnson On the Situation in Saigon in '63

Memorandum, "Vietnam Situation," from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 21, 1963.

In accordance with your request this morning, this is a summary of my conclusions after my visit to Vietnam on December 19-20.

1. Summary. The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state.

2. The new government is the greatest source of concern. It is indecisive and drifting. Although Minh states that he, rather than the Committee of Generals, is making decisions, it is not clear that this is actually so. In any event, neither he nor the Committee are experienced in political administration and so far they show little talent for it. There is no clear concept on how to re-shape or conduct the strategic hamlet program; the Province Chiefs, most of whom are new and inexperienced, are receiving little or no direction because the generals are so preoccupied with essentially political affairs. A specific example of the present situation is that General [name illegible] is spending little or no time commanding III Corps, which is in the vital zone around Saigon and needs full-time direction. I made these points as strongly as possible to Minh, Don, Kim, and Tho.

3. The Country Team is the second major weakness. It lacks leadership, has been poorly informed, and is not working to a common plan. A recent example of confusion has been conflicting USOM and military recommendations both to the Government of Vietnam and to Washington on the size of the military budget. Above all, Lodge has virtually no official contact with Harkins. Lodge sends in reports with major military implications without showing them to Harkins, and does not show Harkins important incoming traffic. My impression is that Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. This has of course been stressed to him both by me and by Harkins and myself.

(and also by John McCone), and I do not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now.

Lodge's newly-designated deputy, David Nes, was with us and seems a highly competent team player. I have stated the situation frankly to him and he has said he would do all he could to constitute what would in effect be an executive committee operating below the level of the Ambassador.

As to the grave reporting weakness, both Defense and CIA must take major steps to improve this. John McCone and I have discussed it and are acting vigorously in our respective spheres.

4. Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon. The Strategic Hamlet Program was seriously over-extended in those provinces, and the Viet Cong has been able to destroy many hamlets, while others have been abandoned or in some cases betrayed or pillaged by the government's own Self Defense Corps. In these key provinces, the Viet Cong have destroyed almost all major roads, and are collecting taxes at will.

As remedial measures, we must get the government to re-allocate its military forces so that its effective strength in these provinces is essentially doubled. We also need to have major increases in both military and USOM staffs, to sizes that will give us a reliable, independent U.S. appraisal of the status of operations. Thirdly, realistic pacification plans must be prepared, allocating adequate resources to government-controlled areas and work out from there.

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tially in recent months. General Harkins still hopes these areas may be made reasonably secure by the latter half of next year.

In the gloomy southern picture, an exception to the trend of Viet Cong success may be provided by the possible adherence to the government of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, which total three million people and control key areas along the Cambodian border. The Hoa Hao have already made some sort of agreement, and the Cao Dai are expected to do so at the end of this month. However, it is not clear that their influence will be more than neutralized by these agreements, or that they will in fact really pitch in on the government's side.

5. Infiltration of men and equipment from North Vietnam continues using (a) land corridors through Laos and Cambodia; (b) the Mekong River waterways from Cambodia; (c) some possible entry from the sea and the tip of the Delta. The best guess is that 1000-1500 Viet Cong cadres entered South Vietnam from Laos in the first nine months of 1963. The Mekong route (and also the possible sea entry) is apparently used for heavier weapons and ammunition and raw materials which have been turning up in increasing numbers in the south and of which we have captured a few shipments.

To counter this infiltration, we reviewed in Saigon various plans providing for cross-border operations into Laos. On the scale proposed, I am quite clear that these would not be politically acceptable or even militarily effective. We need a more immediate U-2 mapping of the whole Laos and Cambodian border; and this we are preparing on an urgent basis.

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